Industrial
Organization
Exam Two
Friday May 16
Spring 2014
.
A. Major Laws
1.
2. Clayton
Act 1914
3. Federal Trade
Commission Act 1914
B. Enforcement
Agencies
1. Department of Justice
2. FTC
3. private
C. Enforcement varies
1. stricter
periods
2. lax
periods
3. political
climate
a. Presidential
appointees
b. new laws and
amendments
c. public
sentiment
4. court
cases
a. precedent
b. economic theory
D. Antitrust case outcomes
1. Settlement
2. Consent decree
3. Verdict
a. cease and desist
b. fines, prison
c. structural remedy
d. damages (private)
-treble
E. Problems of Monopoly
1. high price, low quantity, excess profits
2. lack of market discipline
a. managerial slack
b. x-inefficiency
3. impact on other markets
a. inputs, outputs
b. extend monopoly
4. Rent seeking
a. devote resources to obtain monopoly power
b. political influence
II. Alternatives to Antitrust
III. Monopolization
A. Sherman Action, Section Two
1. Standard
Oil (1911)
2. American Tobacco
a. dominant firm
created by mergers
b. antitrust case
(1911)
c. break-up
3. US Steel
a. dominant firm
created by mergers
b. antitrust case
c. not guilty
i)
price umbrella allowed rivals to thrive
ii) US
Steel lost market share
B. Rule of Reason
1. Dominant market share alone
is not illegal
a. economies of
scale
b. superior
management
c. efficiency
2. Conduct
matters
3. Each case judged on
its specifics
IV. Price Fixing
A. Sherman Action, Section One
1. Addyston Pipe and Steel (1898)
2. Trenton Potteries (1927)
3. Socony
Vacuum
a. gasoline
retailing
b. dancing partners
c.
“reasonableness” is not a defense: guilty
4. ADM
a. Lysine price fixing
b. antitrust case
c. penalties
B. Per Se illegal
1. Price fixing by competitors
is broadly prohibited
2. Courts do not need to
consider reasonableness or efficiency arguments
3. Very clear standard
V. Mergers
A. Types of mergers
1. Horizontal
mergers
2. Vertical
mergers
3. Conglomerate
mergers
4. International
mergers
B. Rule of Reason
1. market
power vs efficiency
a. substantially
lessen competition (price increases)
b. economies of
scale, management (cost decreases)
2. most
mergers are small, and legal
3. even
large horizontal mergers are considered on the specifics of the case
4. market
definition
a. product
b. geographic
C.
Laws
1. Sherman Act Section Two
(1911)
a. prevents
mergers to create a monopoly
b. only prohibits
extreme instances
2. Clayton Action, Section
Seven (1914)
a. prevents
mergers that substantially lessen competition
b. level of
enforcement varies
i. at times, relatively small horizontal mergers have been
prohibited
ii.
Other times larger mergers have been allowed
3. Cellar
Kefauver Amendment (1950)
4. Hart Scott Rodino Act (1976)
a. requires prior
notification for large mergers
b. FTC and
Department of Justice review
c challenged
mergers usually dropped by firms before court case
D. Cases
1. Brown
Shoe
a. relatively
small horizontal merger
b. some vertical
elements
c. divestiture
2. Coca-Cola Dr Pepper
a. highly
concentrated market
b. challenge
c. block merger; restrict future mergers by Coke
E. Merger Guidelines
1. signal
to firms by FTC & Dept of Justice
2. large horizontal mergers in
concentrated markets are most likely to be challenged
a. if Herfindahl Index < 1500, mergers safe
b. if 1500<Herfindahl <2500
i)
small mergers safe (change in H<100)
ii)
large mergers challenged (change in H>100)
c. if Herfindahl >2500
i)
most mergers by big firms challenged
ii)
very small mergers safe
V.
Antitrust and anticompetitive business practices
A. Antitrust Statutes
1.
a. Section One
b. Restraint of
Trade
i) price fixing
ii) quantity
iii) any kind of agreement to divide markets
2. Clayton Act
a. Section Two
i)
Price discrimination
ii)
that substantially lessens competition
b. Section Three
i)
Tying
1.) Tie-in
sales or bundling
2.) requirement
to buy multiple products together
3.) extend
market power from one product to tied product
ii)
Exclusive dealing
iii)
that substantially lessens competition
3. Federal Trade Commission
a. Section Five
i)
unfair methods of competition
ii)
deception
iii)
broad antitrust authority
B. Resale Price Maintenance
1. Vertical price fixing
a. manufacturer
sets retail price
b. Sherman Act,
Section One
c. reduces
competition between retailers
2. Cases
a. Dr Miles (1911)
- per
se violation
b. Leegin (2007)
i)
makes efficiency argument: fixed prices = better service
ii)
Supreme Court changes to rule of reason standard
C. Price discrimination
1. Necessary conditions
a. monopoly power
b. separate
segments by willingness to pay
c. prevent resale
2. Welfare
effects
a. less consumer
surplus
b. more profit
c. less deadweight
loss
3. Laws
a. Clayton Act,
Section two
b. Robinson Patman Act
4. Utah Pie Case
D. Joint monopoly
1. Breakfast cereal case
a. highly concentrated
b. high prices, high profits
c. little entry
2. What barriers to entry in cereal?
a. product proliferation
b. advertizing
3. Case did not go far enough to establish precedent
E. Strategic Behavior
1. Predation
1. Strategic behavior aimed at causing
rivals to exit
2. Predatory pricing
a. pricing below cost
i) Areeda-Turner rule
ii) P < MC or
P< AVC
b. widespread
accusations
3. competing
theories
a. predation is
irrational
b. predation may be
rational, but it's too costly
c. reputation effect
i.
predatory pricing as an investment
ii.
accept losses now
iii. discourage future competition
iv.
"irrational" behavior can maximize long-run
profits
4. AA- Legend Airlines case
a. AA: vigorous response to new entrants
b. very low prices drove Legend to bankruptcy
c. AA raised prices after Legend's exit
d. "insufficient evidence"
2. Entry & Contestability
1. Free entry will prevent monopoly pricing
a. high profits attract entry
b. entrants lower prices and displace incumbents
c. monopolies will not elevate prices because they fear entry
2. barriers to entry
a. ownership of critical resources
b. Legal restrictions
c. trade secrets
d. imperfect capital markets
e. sunk costs
f. information problems
g. strategic behavior
i) predation
ii) limit pricing
iii) excess capacity
3. Airlines
a. appeared to be contestable
b. barriers to entry
i) landing slots
ii)
gates
Industrial Organization and Public Policy