Several immediate projects come relatively directly out of my dissertation. One of those is a paper entitled "Overlapping Senses of Justification," which will be in circulation shortly. The argument there is that if a two-sense view of epistemic justification were to be adopted, the best way of construing the distinction between the senses would be as an overlapping distinction, rather than an inclusive or exclusive distinction.

Another is an argument that although there seem to be several distinct ways of conceiving of internalism, the distinctions between those conceptions threaten to break down upon closer inspection. A third is a paper on the utility of a two-sense approach to justification for agents, assessors, and theorists on particular issues, in particular the issues of testimony and normativity. A fourth is a discussion of the implications that would result from adopting a two-sense view of epistemic justification for particular epistemological theories, such as coherence theories, foundations theories, and reliabilist theories.

Some of my future projects will flow naturally from my dissertation. That project leaves unanswered many questions, such as:
- how might an analysis of knowledge proceed on a two-sense view of justification?
- how might a two-sense view of justification be used to answer classic epistemological problems, such as skepticism?
- how might a two-sense view of justification help with the Gettier problem?
- are there also fundamental systematic ambiguities in epistemological concepts other than justification, such as evidence, rationality, and certainty?
I have a strong interest in pursuing the answers to these questions and more.

An epistemological paper I'm working on now involves the issue of "false memory syndrome" and related psychological phenomena. It seems that our cognition is capable of adopting pseudo-memories that bear enough of the hallmarks of legitimate memories that it becomes hard to articulate a theory of memorial justification that excludes them. I suggest that a solution is to distinguish two senses of justification, such that pseudo-memories of various kinds become internally or subjectively justified (and blameless), but externally or objectively unjustified. One upshot of pseudo-memories is to deflate an internalist insistence on factors accessible to conscious awareness as sufficient for epistemic justification.

A related interest is in issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind relating to the flexibility of background belief sets, as illustrated by situations like hypnosis, brainwashing, and the flexibility of proprioception and body-awareness. There is evidence that we can be convinced that there is no number seven, or made to feel that our nose is three feet long. I am interested in exploring the implications for the organization of our cognition as well as for factors involved in internal justification such as coherence and foundational relations.

Another issue in which I have a research interest is the area of social epistemology. For instance, I am currently interested in exploring the influence of social institutions and factors on cognition, reasoning, and belief-formation. Social institutions can have an impact on language-learning, concept-acquisition, choice of reasoning tools, default reasoning strategies, and criteria for endorsement or rejection of potential beliefs. I am interested in exploring and assessing these impacts from an epistemological standpoint.

In philosophy of mind, I have a current interest in the topic of "mind-reading", or how we determine the mental states of others. In particular, I am interested in exploring the nature of blended views invoking theory and simulation. I believe there are potentially insurmountable methodological problems distinguishing between the components from a cognitive science point of view. For instance, based on observable inputs and outputs, a mental chain of events in which a theory determines what simulation process will take place is indistinguishable from a mental chain of events in which a theory modifies the output of a simulation process.

In epistemology, I am currently interested in working on issues to do with "self-trust", or the role that trust of oneself and one's reasoning plays in epistemology. I am exploring a problem for theories that invoke self-trust as a necessary condition for justification: that many of our most fundamental and helpful beliefs (e.g., about physics, the metaphysics of objects, color, abstract objects, and the nature of probability) may be technically speaking false.